Are Palestinian Authority’s legislated statutes substantially different from Israeli military orders? by Khalil, Asem
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228154168
Are	(Palestinian	Authority’s)	Legislated	Statutes
Substantially	Different	from	(Israeli)	Military
Orders?
Article		in		SSRN	Electronic	Journal	·	April	2010
DOI:	10.2139/ssrn.1598508
CITATIONS
0
READS
37
1	author:
Asem	Khalil
Max	Planck	Institute	for	Comparative	Public	…
35	PUBLICATIONS			18	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
All	in-text	references	underlined	in	blue	are	linked	to	publications	on	ResearchGate,
letting	you	access	and	read	them	immediately.
Available	from:	Asem	Khalil
Retrieved	on:	29	September	2016
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1598508
This paper is still a draft, please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. Asem Khalil.  Page 1 
 
Are (Palestinian Authority’s) Legislated Statutes substantially different from (Israeli) 
Military Orders?  
 
Asem Khalil* 
Contents 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
II. Why they are Different (and why do I ask)? ............................................................................... 4 
III. What is (Rule of) Law? ................................................................................................................. 8 
IV. Testing Legal Enactments .......................................................................................................... 12 
V. Rejecting Formal Conceptions of the Rule of Law ................................................................. 18 
VI. Law, Freedom and Rights .......................................................................................................... 21 
VII. Conclusion: Legislated Statutes and the Rule of Law .......................................................... 24 
 
I. Introduction 
During Second World War, Lord Atkin famously contradicted Cicero’s 2000-year-old dictum 
(Silent enim leges inter arma),1 when he said: “In this country, amid the clash of arms the laws 
are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.”2 
In contemporary states, it is rare to rule by brutal force, even in times of emergencies, threats 
to national security, or even in times of occupation of an alien population. Israel indeed 
ruled West Bank and Gaza Strip using law and legality. Changes to local Palestinian legal and 
judicial systems were often introduced through military orders.  
In this paper I discuss the nature and role of rules by legislated statutes, enacted by the 
Palestinian Authority since its establishment in 1994, and the rules by military orders, 
enacted by Israel since its occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza 
Strip since 1967. I investigate on the difference between both enactments, their place within 
the legal system of the occupied Palestinian territory, and their contribution into framing and 
                                               
* Asem Khalil is a Global Hauser Research Fellow at NYU School of Law, Assistant Professor of Law at 
Birzeit University: akhalil@birzeit.edu. The author profited a lot from auditing the course on the Rule of Law 
by Prof. Jeremy Waldron during Spring 2010 at NYU School of Law.  
1 Quoted in: (Barak 2003, 130). 
2 Quoted in: (Lowry 1992, 119). For a discussion, see generally (Dyzenhaus 2004).  
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limiting state’s exercise of power over the population under its jurisdiction. Indirectly, but 
inevitably, this paper will give an insight on the difference that exists between the law 
produced by a national law giver and the law produced by an alien law giver.  
To make my case simpler, I imagine a Palestinian judge,3 in the court of Ramallah in 1968, 
one year after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, who needed to rule whether to accept 
the claim of the plaintiff, based on a military order, or the respondent opposite claim, based 
on a rule present in a Jordanian law. If he admits that rules contained in military order are 
rules of law, then the second question would be whether he is under the moral obligation to 
apply the military order.4 I then imagine the same judge in 1997, three years after the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority, having to rule a similar case without any 
legislation, yet, from the Palestinian Authority. What to do?5 The list of cases in which the 
legality of legislated enactments may be under question may continue.6  
                                               
3 In this paper it is not my concern to discuss whether there would be enough reasons for an individual to 
consider those enactments as law, and whether, based on his personal judgment and conviction, he will feel 
obliged to obey that law. In such an enterprise, any theoretical construction without the support of empirical 
data would be at best useless and at worse misleading. Rather in this paper my concern goes to those officials, 
who need to decide in concrete cases what the law is and whether they are under the moral obligation to obey 
it. Similarly, a lawyer, approached by a client, is going to ask the same questions. Most importantly, it is often 
the case that the attitude of both judges and lawyers towards the law, mainly in the administration of justice, is 
often given a value that transcends specific cases, and the individual rules. Their fidelity to law may be 
considered at best as recognizing certain rules as being valid law, or, at worse as legitimating an evil legal 
system.  
4 Less than one year after Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian judges had to deal with 
such questions. In an interesting article in 1968, Yehuda Z. Blum discussed the two decisions handed down (on 
February 5, 1968) by the Hebron magistrate Mr. Hussein El-Shajuchi, and (on February 27, 1968) by 
Bethlehem magistrate, Mr. Tawfik El-Sakka. The former have rejected to apply Order No.145 of 1967 
concerning the status of Israeli advocates in the courts of Judea and Samaria, while the second magistrate 
reached the diametrically opposed legal conclusion concerning the validity of Order No. 145. For a discussion 
of those two cases, see (Blum 1968).  
5 The Palestinian Appellate Court of Ramallah had to deal with such a question, in the case 809/97, issued on 
November 17, 1998, rejecting the appellant argument against the application of Military Order n.771 of 1978 
on the case. The Court held that military orders that established legal positions and accumulated rights remain 
in force until duly abrogated. Similar conclusion was reached earlier, on September 14, 1998, by the same court 
in decision 634/97, in which the court rejected the arguments advanced by the judge of first instance, in which 
he rejects the application of Military Order no.1271.  
6 I can for example imagine the same long lived judge deciding a case in 2005, this time with a legislated statute 
by the Palestinian Legislative Council, an elected body for the Interim period, which was supposedly to be over 
already since 1999. In 2008, I imagine him in need to decide cases in which the concerned statute is effectively 
legislated by presidential decree. Although I do not have found cases in which such questions are decided, it is 
often the case that public discussion had reached, not only the status of legislation enacted by the Palestinian 
Authority after the end of the Interim period, but also the status of the Palestinian Authority itself. Similar 
discussion regarding the legality of rule by decree since 2007 by Palestinian Authority’s President and his 
nominated technocrat government is increasingly questioned.  
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Writing about the substantial differences between the Palestinian Authority legislated statutes 
and the Israeli Military Orders is not an academic exercise; a luxury enterprise, superfluous 
or unnecessary in the current state of affairs of the occupied Palestinian territory. On the 
contrary, it is a legal and moral concern that each judge or jurist needs to deal with at a 
certain point of his career. It is an inquiry in the legal character of the rules included therein 
and the attitude one ought to have towards them. In other words, I make two different, but 
completely interrelated, questions: First, do rules included in both enactments constitute 
rules of law? Second, if yes, is there any moral obligation to obey those rules?7 The following 
sections will not provide one unique answer to the above questions. The nature of the rules 
included in those enactments will largely depend on the concept the judge has of law. At the 
same time, the characterization of those rules as law, or the denial thereof, will have 
repercussions on the attitude towards those rules.  
I will first exclude possible narratives and suggest the Rule of Law as a paradigm for testing 
both enactments (Section II).8 I will then provide different conceptions of the Rule of Law 
that takes the way rules are created and applied as their basis; i.e. the formal conceptions of 
the Rule of Law (Section III). Being a multifaceted political ideal,9 the Rule of Law provides 
different sets of criteria on the way law ought-to-be, upon which it is possible to test both 
enactments (Section IV). I will suggest that a formal conception of the Rule of Law is not 
enough (Section V). It is only through substantial conceptions of the Rule of Law in which 
freedom and rights are part of what the law is, can provide a distinctive character of 
legislated statutes from military orders (Section VI). I will conclude by arguing that legislated 
statutes constitute a sine qua non for the Rule of Law (substantially conceived), but, 
legislation alone, does not necessarily lead to that political ideal (Section VII).  
                                               
7 A third question is haunting judges and lawyers when dealing with unjust laws, as a “specter” – to use the 
same word of the editor of Law and Social Inquiry, Stephen Ellmann (Ellmann 1995, 339) – because they find 
themselves often using the terms of laws they despise. Although of great relevance, I will not deal with the 
impact of the application of judges and lawyers to military orders, beyond what I refer to in later stage as 
recognition of them as valid rules of law (in the Hartian sense). It is a different issue whether recourse to law 
under occupation should be interpreted as having a legitimating force. I tend to disagree with such an 
approach, although much more is still needed to support this claim, but which goes beyond my concern in this 
paper.  
8 I will capitalize the Rule of Law to distinguish it from a rule of law, which typically refers to a particular legal 
rule, that can have different sources, included a legislative statute or a military order. For a discussion about the 
difference between rules and law, see generally (Schauer 1991).  
9 (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 6). 
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II. Why they are Different (and why do I ask)? 
It may be argued that what seems prima facie to distinguish between both kinds of enactments 
is the participation or the absence of the governed themselves in the process of law making. 
Palestinians indeed were simply recipients of Israeli enactments or fiats, unilaterally adopted 
and vertically imposed on them. In the case of legislated statutes on the other hand, enacted 
by a legitimate national authority and by an elected body, Palestinians are somehow 
participants in the process of law making. In this account, it is the participation of the ruled 
themselves in the process of law making that makes the rule by legislated statutes 
substantially different from the rule by military orders. Democracy and democratic 
institutions, in other words, distinguish between both legal enactments.  
This kind of argument is misleading, though. In fact, the above premises may serve to 
postulate a second conclusion, almost inevitable, i.e. in case of deficiency in the participation 
of the governed in the law-making process, the rule by statute by a national authority, would 
not be substantially different from a rule by milﺆﺸﺑitary orders by an alien authority. 
Accordingly, there would be no substantial difference between rules set up by a non-
democratic national regime and rules set up by alien authority, whether colonial or 
occupation authorities. This conclusion is somehow disturbing, but it is also contrary to the 
way international law deals with occupation on the one side and undemocratic regimes on 
the other. Most importantly it means that it cannot be ruled out, a priori, whether or not rules 
by statutes are substantially different from rules by military orders, because one should first 
assess whether the law giver, in the case of a national authority, is the legitimate authority to 
make law. It is also impossible to rule out a priori what constitutes enough level of 
participation of the governed in the process of law making.  
A second approach is possible; an approach that uses the goals targeted by the enactments as 
a criteria of differentiation, rather than the authority of their creator. Here, the law is a tool, 
not an objective; and the law-making is nothing else but the machinery for politics (as a 
result of the will or interests of the law giver) to take control of subjects within the 
jurisdiction of the existent regime. The difficulty with this approach is that it takes the 
discussion to a different level without necessarily helping us determine whether the rule by 
legislated statutes and the rule by military order are substantially different. In both cases, 
indeed, the enactments are perceived as tools towards certain objectives; both may be 
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accordingly evaluated and tested based on agreed standards or criteria. Such standards may 
include, but not limited to, whether the rules served the interest of the governed, or served 
as a colonial tool, for example.  
While it is not excluded that the rule by legislated statutes would result to be different from 
rule by military orders, such an approach may not help to conclude definitively that the 
opposite postulation is excluded a priori; rather, this approach will be inclined to suggest a 
case by case analysis, where each statute and each military order needs to be scrutinized 
according to the agreed upon standards. The perplexity then will be to find out that some of 
the military orders really served the local population interest, and that some statutes are not 
adopted to serve national interests. In both cases, it cannot be ruled out a priori what the 
national interest is. This will lead us to conclude, that such an approach is unable to 
differentiate substantially between rules by statute, and rules by military orders.  
A third approach is possible, an approach that looks at the way certain individuals exercise 
governmental power over individuals. Governing by rules rather than coercing by applying 
brutal force may differentiate between both enactments. The advantage here is that the law 
has certain objectivity, regardless of the authority of its author, and regardless of the 
objectives or goals it may be targeting, or the interests they may be serving. The disadvantage 
is that it cannot provide a differentiating tool, since it is absolutely rare, in times of 
occupation and even in times of colonization, to govern exclusively by applying brutal force. 
The recourse to law and legality serve even in those extreme cases to facilitate governability 
of the population, and reduce its cost.10 Israel indeed used military declarations and orders to 
rule the territories occupied in 1967 (or to use Israeli term, to ‘administer the areas under its 
control’).11 This means that in both cases, in fact, the effective authority used rules to govern 
the population under its control, rather than brutal force (or at least reduced to the bare 
minimum the areas where brutal force is applied). Accordingly, this approach, despite its 
                                               
10 The recourse to legality does not necessarily have a legitimating objective but may simply serve other 
objectives, such as the rationalization of oppressive policies where law is used to realize colonial projects, but 
also reflects the need of maintaining internal cohesion and morale or gain international approval for their 
policies. See (Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories 1994, 468-71). For 
Yuval Shany law serves as a discourse “[g]iven that law is generally respected in Israel.” (Shany 2008, 7).  
11 As pointed out by Yuval Shany the fact that Israel is generally committed to the rule of law in its internal 
affairs, adds another important dimension to the assessment of the utility of the legal discourse in occupation-
related matters.” (Shany 2008, 7). 
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attractiveness will not provide adequate tool of differentiation between legislated statutes and 
military orders.   
While assessing that there seems to be a tacit assumption that Israeli military orders are 
substantially different from the Palestinian Authority legislated statutes, the above examples 
show that there can easily be a disagreement about why this is so. Most importantly, there 
appears to be no interest in the literature to distinguish between both kinds of legal 
enactments. The fact that we assume it, rather than try to explain it, is significant. It may be 
explicable in two different ways: First, it is possible that for many people this may seem 
simply obvious to the point that explaining it may be considered merely a superfluous 
academic exercise. (“For God’s sake,” they may say: “How can the military order of an 
occupying power not be different from a statute created by a nationally and legitimately 
elected body?”) Accordingly, they simply assume that they are different, without further 
explanation. Second, others may be skeptical about the whole enterprise, ab initio, because 
differentiating between statutes enacted by a national authority on the one side and military 
order enacted by an occupation authority on the other side may suggest –indirectly but 
inevitably – that since comparable, they share a minimum of characteristics that justified the 
comparison at first place.  
My postulation in this paper is that the assumption about existence of a substantial 
difference between the two legal enactments is correct. My objective is to provide an 
account of the reasons why they are so. The (hopefully plausible) claim I make in this paper is 
that it is possible to distinguish between the rule by legislated statutes and the rule by military 
orders by making reference to the ideal of Rule of Law, as an ought-to-be law, which is, in 
my account, strictly connected to the concept of law, concerned with the nature of law itself, 
i.e. to what makes a law, at first place, law.12 Before that; however, let me set up the terms of 
my enterprise, which serve as premises for the arguments I intend to make in later stages.   
First, in this paper, I depart from an understanding of both statutes and military orders in a 
very neutral way. For me they both represent: (1) legal enactments at a specific historical 
moment (accordingly I exclude any reference to rules that emerged over time, with the 
                                               
12 The fact that I connect the Rule of Law as an ideal to the concept of law means that I agree with Waldron’s 
proposition that both indeed need to be grasped together, and that “we cannot really grasp the concept of law 
without at the same time understanding the values comprised in the Rule of law.” (Waldron, The Concept and 
the Rule of Law 2008, 10).   
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possible contribution of the judiciary or the administration itself) (2) by a law-giver 
(regardless of who is the law-giver, whether a national or alien authority) (3) aiming at 
creating new norms (regardless of the content of those legal norms) which are (4) enforced 
by the authority having an effective or at least the minimum of control over certain territory 
and certain populations (regardless of the goals they may be implicitly or explicitly willing to 
achieve).  
Second, my account is based on a distinction that I draw between rule by and through law on 
the one side, and the Rule of Law on the other.13 While the first two are essential for the 
latter, if they are taken alone, this paper argues, the rule by and through law may lead to what is 
the complete opposite of the Rule of Law. This distinction will serve in later stages to 
distinguish between what I perceive to be Hart’s position of a legal system which exists 
regardless of the inner morality of the law; while Fuller claimed that it is a sine qua non for a 
legal system to exist at first place.14  
Third, while claiming that the Rule of Law provides a valid (paradigm for understanding and 
a valid) tool for differentiating between rule by legislated statutes and the rule by military 
orders, I do not argue that the establishment of the Palestinian Authority had automatically 
converted the legal system to a Rule of Law. Accordingly my point of departure is a 
                                               
13 The rule by law means that the government itself subjects its will power to the constraints of the law and the 
rule through law means that the acts of domination must acquire the form of the law. For Preuss, those are the 
“twofold meaning” of the rule of law. (Preuss 1996, 16). However, as rightly pointed out by Jeffrey Kahn, the 
rule by law and the rule through law describe a political system in which statutes and other legislation are the 
supreme authority in the state by virtue of adherence to a formal legislative process of passing statutes and 
other legal acts.” (Kahn 2006). For him, this system represents a Rechtsstaat but not a rule of law. In this paper 
we adopt a concept of the rule of law similar to Kahn, not Preuss. To my understanding, early positivist, such 
as the eighteenth century utilitarian theorist and reformer, Bentham, would have individualized principles 
needed for controlling the abuse of power. Hart for example believed that in Bentham work it is possible 
indeed to identify the elements of Rechtstaat. For him, those principles are now revived by natural law theorists 
(Hart 1958, 595).  
Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the rule of law goes beyond the limits imposed by the state itself in 
the way it makes laws, execute them, or apply them. In such a system, “the state is not the sole source of law 
and adherence to procedural formality is necessary but not sufficient for law to be made.” (Kahn 2006, 364). 
This is why the evaluation I will make to both military orders and statutes is not done based on constraints 
imposed by the law giver itself in the way he decides to make law, execute and apply them, but rather on the 
basis of principles (or sets of principles), individualized to be forming the meaning of the phrase “rule of law”.  
14 See the famous debate of Hart and Fuller on Harvard Law Journal, (Hart 1958); (Fuller, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals - A Reply to Professor Hart 1958). John Quigley for example used Fuller’s 
argument to argue that the Israeli military government of the occupied Palestinian territory, although used 
legality, cannot be considered as a legal system proper, but rather “a set of arbitrary rules” (Quigly 1981, 119). 
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distinction between the legal system on the one side, that can exist in any system (i.e. a 
system of that use law to rules to govern), and on the other side, the rule-of-law legal system.  
III. What is (Rule of) Law? 
I do not pretend to give an exhaustive answer to what the Rule of Law is (Nobody does!) or 
even to what the law is; there are indeed different approaches to and different conceptions 
of the law. In what follows I will provide two sets of principles that stand in completely 
opposite extremes; the first is held by legal theorists that are often grouped under the 
umbrella of legal positivism, with special attention to Austin, Kelsen and Hart (that I will 
call, for an issue of convenience, “Rule of Law tout court”), and the second is held by Fuller, 
and his insistence on the inner morality of law (that I will call, “Rule of Law as legality”), 
completed by Waldron’s insight (that I will call, “Rule of Law as procedure”).  
In Austin positivism, law is a phenomenon of large societies with a sovereign (that can be 
one person or one group) who have supreme and absolute de facto power. Accordingly, law is 
nothing else but the sovereign command backed by threat of force or sanctions. Austin’s 
sovereign seems to be the Leviathan of Hobbes, who is not Subject to the Civil Laws, since 
he has the power to make, and repeal such laws.15 This means that law is law, regardless of 
the existence of a moral right to rule or whether the commands are meritorious.16 As much 
as there is a sovereign, there is unity, and accordingly, there is a legal system.  
Kelsen and Hart instead maintained that law is normative and must be understood as such.17 
For the unity of the legal system depended not on the imperative character of rules and their 
connection with a sovereign’s command, but rather in their linkage to each other.18 Kelsen 
and Hart differed in the way they explained this linkage. For Kelsen, each rule is linked to 
another, in one chain of authority.19 Hart considered law as the union of primary and 
secondary rules.20 At certain point the inquiry regarding the linkage of norms, Kelsen stops 
                                               
15 (Hobbes 1904 (1651), 190). See generally chapter 26 of Hobbes’ Leviathon.  
16 (Green, Legal Positivism 2003). 
17 (Green, Legal Positivism 2003). 
18 For Kelsen, “[l]aw is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules having the kind of unity we 
understand by a system. It is impossible to grasp the nature of law if we limit our attention to the single isolated 
rule.” (Kelsen 2007(1945), 3). 
19 (Green, Legal Positivism 2003). 
20 (Hart, The Concept of Law 1961, 77-96) 
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and presupposes a (hypothetical) “basic norm”. Such a norm, because foundational, is not a 
legal norm, and cannot be social fact (no “ought” from “is”).21 It is that last assertion that 
Hart rejects. Hart indeed seems to favor an empirical view of rules, rather than a 
transcendental one. For him, the ultimate criterion of validity in a legal system is social 
(secondary rules) that exists only because it is actually practiced (according to the rule of 
recognition).22  
If we pose the above two questions to Austin, Kelsen and Hart, what tips can they provide 
him to proceed with his investigation? On the issue of the nature of the rules included in 
those enactments, I take Austin to be interested in checking out whether or not military 
orders and legislated statutes are the commands of the sovereign, backed with the threat of 
sanction. On the contrary, I take Kelsen to insist on investigating whether those enactments 
are issued by an authorized law-giver according to superior norm. Finally, I take Hart to be 
interested on investigating whether those enactments (containing primary rules) are coherent 
with the secondary rules, practiced and recognized as such by the officials.  
As for the second question, I believe the answer would be unanimous in refusing to rule out 
any moral obligation of obedience or disobedience. They may even agree on the possibility 
of having a moral obligation to disobey evil laws, but the core issue for them will still be the 
same: Law is separated from morality. However, as it least well pointed out by Hart, the 
separation theory need not to lead to the trap of legalism,23 in which the insistence on the 
separation between law and morality is simply exploited to realize evil objectives, thus 
refusing criticism of bad laws in the name of “law as law”. In any case, for legal positivists, I 
take them to insist, the fidelity to law is different from the nature of law, because law is 
separated from morality. Accordingly, a rule may fail the test of morality, but is still a rule of 
law.  
The other extreme position on the spectrum is the one defended fiercely by Lon Fuller, who 
revived the tradition of natural law. For him, a rule that does not pass the test of legality is 
not a legal rule. Legality of rules depends on satisfying eight principles that Fuller 
individualized: law ought to be general, publicly promulgated, prospective, intelligible, 
                                               
21 (Green, Legal Positivism 2003). 
22 (Green, Legal Positivism 2003). 
23 See generally (Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals 2008).  
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consistent, practicable, not too frequently changeable, and actually congruent with the 
behavior of the officials of a regime.24 A similar list is present in John Finnis writings, 
although with different order,25 as much as in the writings of Joseph Raz.26  
For Fuller, those principles constitute the inner morality of law. Since law is not separated 
from morality in Fuller’s account, an immoral law is not law at all. It is “morality that makes 
law possible”,27 because "[t]o command what cannot be done is not to make law; it is to 
unmake law, for a command that cannot be obeyed serves no end but confusion, fear and 
chaos."28 It is not surprising then, based on that rationale given by Fuller of his eight 
principles, that other scholars reduced his list to one basic idea (law should be capable of 
providing effective guidance, such as in Joseph Raz29) or two (there must be rules and those 
rules must be capable of being followed, such as in Margaret Radin30).31  
As a logical consequence of the second sets of principles, Waldron suggests to give due 
consideration of the way law is enforced on concrete cases. Simply stated, it means that law 
will be enforced exactly in the same way it was intended originally; thus individuals guided by 
rules, will not fall in the trap of law. In other words, once conflicts arise, justice will be 
administered impartially, and parties in conflict will not be disappointed by enforcing on 
them a law that is different from the one that have guided their actions at first place. 
Waldron suggested calling them procedural principles, as complementary to Fuller’s 
principles,32 that Waldron considers as being rather formal and structural in character.33  
                                               
24 (Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised Edition 1969, 43), (Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept (in Florida)? 2002, 154). 
25 (Finnis 1980, 270), cited in: (Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)? 
2002, 154).  
26 (Raz 1979, 214-9). 
27 (Finnis 1980, 41).  
28 (Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised Edition 1969, 37).  
29 (Raz 1979, 218), cited in: (Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)? 2002, 
154). 
30 (Radin 1989, 785). 
31 For a discussion of those different views, see: (Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested 
Concept (in Florida)? 2002, 154-5). I believe that those who try at any cost to interpret Fuller account 
positivistically miss the essential point that law is and cannot be separate from morality. 
32 (Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure forthcoming 2010). Waldron even tried to 
individualize eight ‘laundry list’ that correspond to Fuller eight principles, a hearing by an impartial tribunal; a 
legally-trained judicial officer; a right to representation by counsel; a right to be present at all critical stages of 
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In my account, despite being separated apart from Inner morality of law, Waldron’s Rule of 
Law as Procedure are simply fuller’s other face of the coin, at least when Waldron consider 
those procedural principles as forming part of the formal conceptions of the Rule of Law. If, 
instead, Waldron perceives those procedural principles as requiring something ‘substantive’, 
such as fairness and non-arbitrariness, they may be in tension with the ideal of Rule of Law 
as legality, because they go beyond the formal aspect of rules and the way they were 
enacted.34 Waldron himself refers to Dicey’s account of the Rule of Law as portraying both 
the emphasis on the normal operation of the ordinary courts, as much as on the 
characteristics of the norms they are administered.35  
If we pose the same two questions to Fuller and Waldron, what will be their insights? I take 
Fuller suggesting the need to check out whether the concerned rules pass the test of legality 
(the eight principles of the inner morality of law). If they do, then they are moral, and 
accordingly, they are law; if they don’t, then they are not law at all. Waldron would not be 
satisfied by this inquiry alone. He would rather suggest continuing the inquiry on the way 
justice is administered. In case of moral law, there is no way to escape the simple conclusion 
that there is a moral obligation to obey moral law.  
                                                                                                                                            
the proceeding; to confront witnesses against the detainee; to an assurance that the evidence presented by the 
government has been gathered in a properly supervised way; to present evidence in one’s own behalf; to make 
legal argument about the bearing of the evidence; to hear reasons from the tribunal when it reaches its decision; 
and finally some right of appeal to a higher tribunal of a similar character.  
33 (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 7). 
34 Waldron himself admits that: For the most part, there are two currents of thought sit comfortably together. 
They complement each other. Clear, general public norms are valueless if they are not properly administered, 
and fair procedures are no good if the applicable rules keep changing or are ignored altogether. But there are 
aspects of the procedural side of the Rule of Law that are in some tension with the ideal of formal 
predictability. The procedural side of the Rule of Law presents a mode of governance that allows people a 
voice, a way of intervening on their own behalf in confrontation with power. It requires that public institutions 
sponsor and facilitate reasoned argument in human affairs… By emphasizing the legal process rather than the 
formal attributes of the determinate norms that are supposed to emerge from that process, the procedural 
aspects of the Rule of Law seem to place a premium on values that are somewhat different from those emphasized in the 
formal picture.” (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 8) (Emphasis added). Since I will dedicate a 
section for substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law, I will refer to Waldron’s insight in sections III and IV 
as being complementary to Fuller’s Rule of Law as legality. It should be noted however, that Waldron had 
identified some features that are not being substantive features, because they simply related to characteristics 
that define “a mode of governance that takes people seriously as dignified and active presences in the world.” 
(Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 40). 
35 (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 7). 
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IV. Testing Legal Enactments 
There are different examples in the literature that show how Israeli military orders fail the 
test of legality, based on one of Fuller’s desiderata.36 It is true that Fuller himself admits that 
the eight desiderata work as a system and, accordingly, he seems to agree that it is a matter of 
degree. However, in Fuller’s account, some are more important than others, such as public 
promulgation for example.37 
John Quigley since 1981 – reviewing Shehadeh’s book on Israeli military orders applied in 
the West Bank– made explicit reference to Fuller principles, especially the one that states 
that a law ought to be publically promulgated.38 In fact Quigely was fascinated by the book’s 
revelation that “texts of the military orders that constitute legislation in the West Bank are 
inaccessible to the public and available only on a limited basis to practicing lawyers”.39 
Similar reaction appears in the forward made to the same book by Niall Macdermot, 
Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists.40 This does not mean that 
Israel was not “legalistic”41 or “legalized”42; on the contrary. It is often the case that Israel’s 
                                               
36 It can be argued for example that Israeli military orders imposing and institutionalizing discriminatory 
practices vis-à-vis local Palestinian population, and applying dual system of law directed towards local 
population on the one side, and Israeli settlers on the other (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West 
Bank 1988, 63-75). Israel also issued thousands of military orders and changed constantly the law, thus failing 
the principle of constituency and the stability of law. It is also by military orders that settlers were exempted 
from the Palestinian courts’ jurisdiction. In 1980s, Israel established “municipal courts” for each settlement, 
rendering the settlers also de iure excluded from Palestinain courts’ jurisdiction. See (Kassim 1984, 32). Through 
Oslo agreements, Israel and the PLO agreed to limit jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, excluding 
jurisdiction over Israeli citizens (See article XVII of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip of 1995). Concerning legal status of Israeli settlers, see generally (Quigley, Living in Legal 
Limbo: Israel's Settlers in Occupied Palestinian Territory 1998). 
37 (Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)? 2002, 154).  
38 (Quigley, Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of Law 1981, 119).  
39 (Quigley, Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of Law 1981, 118).  
40 “There have been isolated cases, as in Chile, where one or two decrees of a military government have been 
treated as secret documents and not published. However, this is the first case to come to the attention of the 
International Commission of Jurists where the entire legislation of a territory is not published in an official 
gazette available to the public.” Quoted in: (Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation 
1992, 151).  
41 Shehadeh for example argued that: “Israel’s occupation has been legalistic” (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel 
and the West Bank 1988, vii). “Israeli pronouncements have tended to be very legalistic, using expedients 
common to the craft of lawyers.” (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 4). George 
Bisharat argued: “Israel has since 1967 administered the West Bank and Gaza Strip through highly legalistic and 
strongly repressive military governments.” (Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli 
Occupation 1995, 349).  
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policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip passed through legal or legal-like enactments.43 
This explains the thousands of military orders adopted separately for both West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, in the first place. In this sense, Israeli rule was not different from colonial 
societies characterized by the reliance on law.44 Based on the Rule of Law as Legality, military 
orders that do not pass the test of legality are simply not law at all. To Fuller’s discontent, 
Hart was right.45 The inner immorality of certain military orders changed nothing in practice 
to its being applied by courts, and continually enforced (Austin’s trilogy of sovereign, 
command, and sanction are satisfied present). Most importantly, it is difficult to imagine the 
opposite, since all Palestinian judges since 1967 (until the establishment of the PA) were 
appointed by, and receive their salary from, the Area Commander,46 and their functions are 
exercised under the supervision of the (Israeli) officer in charge of the judiciary.47  
As rightly pointed out by Hart, rules of law, as separate from morality, should not be 
confused with the commands theory.48 For Austin indeed, it is possible that he would 
conclude that the Israeli Area commander – although subordinate to Israeli Military Defence 
Minister, and to certain limitations imposed by Israeli legal system as such (under the last 
scrutiny of the Israeli Supreme Court)49 – has in fact sovereign power; maintaining the 
effective control of the areas, he is deemed as the supreme power. Accordingly, military 
orders are simply the command of the sovereign, backed by the threat of sanction. Hart 
nonetheless differentiated between the two doctrines of the early positivists, Austin and 
                                                                                                                                            
42 Yuval Shany noticed that one of the characteristic of Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip is that 
it is “exceptionally legalized” (Shany 2008, 7). 
43 As pointed out by Anis Kassim: “By virtue of these Orders, Israel has changed, amended or repealed virtually 
every piece of legislation in these two parcels of Palestinian territory. These changes, primarily designed to 
serve the expansionist policies of the occupying power, have adversely affected, in turn the legal system, the 
judiciary and the law enforcement agencies in the Occupied Territories.” (Kassim 1984, 30). For more about 
the Israeli changing modes of power and policies in the occupied Palestinian territories that go beyond the 
political proclamations, in which there was an attempt to expropriate the occupied land without fully annexing 
it (with the exception of East Jerusalem, which was officially annexed by Israeli Knesset, although deemed 
contrary to international law of occupation), see generally (Gordon 2007).  
44 See (Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories 1994, 496) 
45  (Hart 1958), making reference to Austin argumentations in favor of the separation between law and 
morality.  
46 (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 77). 
47 (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 76). 
48 (Hart 1958, 601) 
49 About the jurisdiction of the Israeli Supreme Court in its capacity of High Court of Justice, see generally 
(Farrell 2002-2003, 879-81); (E. R. Cohen 1986); (Weiner 1995). 
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Bentham: the first doctrine is epistemological and related to the way one can trace the law, 
its source, and the second one is ontological, related to the nature of law. Hart then rejected 
the command theory, without, for that same reason, scarifying what he considers the pillar 
of legal positivism that is the separation between law and morality.50  
In support of the positivist approach using “Rule of Law tout court”, one can cite the simple 
fact that since the 1980s, Israel made a considerable effort to make those military orders 
available.51 Many were still unavailable and unpublished, but the issue is that many 
deficiencies from the perspective of the inner morality of law could be accordingly 
ameliorated, and Fuller would be incapable of denying the legal character of an evil law, 
whenever his tests of legality are respected. The fact that many Palestinian judges and 
lawyers adopt the second approach (thus applying Israeli military orders) may constitute for 
a Hartian jurists to claim that there exist even a rule of recognition. Such judges and lawyers 
in fact seem to depart from the simple fact that the effective authority is Israel, as occupation 
authority, and sometimes Palestinian judges had to deal with those military orders.52  
The hierarchical connection between rules, until a basic rule, according to Kelsen version, 
seems to be also possible to individualize. Israeli military occupation, according to a 
Kelsenian jurist, had created a new fact, that a jurist is not responsible of discussing, but 
simply observing as a matter of fact. This is what I understand from the insistence of Meir 
Shamgar (by then the Military Advocate General) on that the “proclamation [No.1 of 1967] 
was not constitutive but only declaratory.”53 In other words, with the Israeli Army entrance 
into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, what changed was simply the basic norm, the foundation 
of the new legal system. Such a view will deal with military orders as valid law as much as 
                                               
50 For Hart a legal system according to Austinian trilogy (command, sanction, and sovereign) is assimilated to a 
gunman saying to his victim, “Give me your money or your life.” Then he simply argued that “[l]aw surely is 
not the gunman situation writ large, and legal order is surely not to be thus simply identified with compulsion.” 
(Hart 1958, 603). 
51 “In 1982, fifteen years after the beginning of the Israeli occupation, the mitliary orders were finally published 
in their totality. Many of the secondary regulations as well as a number of orders made by virtue of the 
published orders, still remain unavailable.” (Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation 
1992, 151-2). 
52 The West Bank attorneys, immediately after the beginning of the occupation, went on strike, “refusing to 
litigate in court while the Israeli army controlled the West Bank. Gradually, however, most have taken up law 
practice again.” (Quigley, Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of Law 1981, 121).  
53 (Shamgar 1982, 14). For more about the way Israel assumed powers in the areas under its control, see (Farrell 
2002-2003, 876-8). 
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they are linked to superior norms and adopted according to the criteria and authority set up 
by that norm.54 This explains also why State's attorneys justify Israel's actions in the 
territories that restrict the rights of Palestinians on the basis of the law of occupation, while 
at the same time consistently argue that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not occupying 
territory.55  
It seems that the discussion related to the applicability of international humanitarian law 
(whether Hague regulations, or Geneva Conventions)56 fits perfectly in this context. 
Positivists would then rather suggest applying military orders that are adopted according to 
procedures and by the authority of superior norms (Kelsen), or by secondary rules (Hart). 
Even when a prominent Palestinian scholar, such as Raja Shehadeh, argues convincingly that 
Israel, through its military orders, went beyond its powers as occupying authority in 
international law of occupation,57 it seemed that he is also using the same 
positivist/Kelsenian approach. Similarly the discussions towards the Israeli use or misuse of 
British mandate emergency regulations,58 or about the applicability of Geneva Conventions,59 
international human rights conventions,60 fits also within this positivist paradigm.61  
For Israel, maintaining the “Rule of Law tout court” was clearly of concern, from the very 
first days (it is often not so in practice, but the intention and tendency seems to be there, at 
least since the 1980s). The two declarations that followed the first one cited earlier are in fact 
a possible example: Proclamation No.2 states the assumption by the Area Commander of all 
                                               
54 Shehadeh argued: “Perhaps the single most empowering order issued by the area commander, by which the 
commander assumed all legislative, executive, and judicial powers, is Proclamation No.2. This order was issued 
on the first day that the Israeli army occupied the West Bank. Having assumed the power to legislate without 
consultation in any form with the people to whom the legislation would apply, the Israeli commander became 
very prolific. Over forty orders of major importance were issued before the end of the first month of 
occupation.” (Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation 1992, 152). 
55 (Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Terrority 2005, 610).  
56 For a discussion, see (Hassouna 2001), (Imseis 2003)  
57 See for example discussion with regards to administrative detention, (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and 
the West Bank 1988, xi); (Rishmawi 1989). Other scholars inquires the respect of international humanitarian 
law by Israel, see (A. Cohen 2005); (Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied 
Palestinian Terrority 2005).   
58 For a discussion, see (Farrell 2002-2003, 874-5) 
59 Insert discussion about the applicability of Geneva according to initial military orders.  
60 See generally (Harris 2008).  
61 (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, xiv). 
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powers,62 and, Proclamation No.3 created military courts.63 Interestingly, as the Geneva 
conventions were supposed to apply, they were later on deleted, again, by a successive 
military order, and defended based on positivist approach to international law.64 Emma 
Playfair pointed out: “The military government invariably seeks to defend its actions in the 
Occupied Territories with reference to legal provisions of principles, whether international 
or local law.” 65 A similar attitude is also present whenever discussion about the occupation 
power to change local legal system,66 and local judicial system.67 Similarly, many of Fuller’s 
principles would have been satisfied if the Israeli military Area Commander followed the 
guidelines present in the “Manual for the Military Advocate in Military Government”, 
prepared in fact for that same purpose.68  
Waldron’s insistence on the concept of “Rule of Law as procudre” will take him to consider 
the way justice is administered, not only by Israeli military courts but by the Palestinian local 
courts themselves,69 and the responsibility of the Israel, as an occupation authority.70 It is in 
that sense that I understand the insistence of many scholars and human rights activists to 
ensure protection of Palestinians and the application of “due process” to their proceedings. 
It is also in that sense that I understand the preoccupation of Palestinian lawyers about the 
situation in which justice is administered in the territories under Isareli control. As a matter 
                                               
62 For a discussion, see (Farrell 2002-2003, 882).  
63 (Farrell 2002-2003, 879). 
64 (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, xi). For more about those military orders, see 
(Kassim 1984, 29-30).  
65 (Playfair 2003, 205).  
66 See for example (Benvenisti 1992). 
67 (Shehadeh, The West Bank and the Rule of Law 1980); (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 
1988); (Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation 1992).  
68 Such a manual for example provided that every enactment “must be drawn un in Hebrew and Arabic”, shall 
“not come into force until published in written form”, “must be published in an official series available to 
everyone”, “no retrospective legislation was permitted”, etc. See (Shamgar 1982, 30-1).  
69 For more about changes introduced to Palestinian Judicial System, see (Kassim 1984, 30-31). 
70 “There is a widespread corruption amongst the judges, who are appointed by the military authorities, and the 
police refuse to cooperate with the courts in ensuring that the accused or witnesses are brought to court or that 
the decisions of the courts are executed.” (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 7). 
“Shehadeh argues that the Israeli military government has effectively subjugated the Palestinian courts by 
controlling the judges and by removing significant categories of cases from their jurisdiction.” (Quigley, 
Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of Law 1981, 120).   
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of fact, it seems that the intervention of the Israeli Supreme Court in several cases related to 
the Palestinians,71 fits perfectly within this conception of “Rule of Law as procedure”. 
It is possible to show that the Israeli military orders have failed to establish such a system in 
which justice is administered in the way envisaged by the “Rule of Law as procedure”.72 The 
same fact that the law giver is the same judge undermines the possibility of realizing such an 
enterprise, despite the fact that Military Courts as such were established.73 Similarly, Israel 
maintained police power, and the enforcement of courts’ decision would depend on the 
military willingness to do so. Israel made use of security justification to exercise extensively 
and pervasively.74  
Nonetheless, it is possible in abstract to envisage the possibility of ameliorating the way 
justice is administered under Israeli occupation in order to meet criteria set out by “Rule of 
Law as procedure”. It is in that sense that I perceive the establishment in the 1980s of a 
“Civilian Administration” which institutionalized the civilian and military functions of the 
military government of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.75 Such creation also resulted in 
converting military orders, from security measures, to essential part of the law of the land. 
The Area Commander gave the Head of the Civilian Administration the power to proclaim 
subsidiary legislation.76 It is in that sense that I understand the acceptance of the Israeli High 
Court to hear petitions from Palestinian subjects.77 It is in that sense too that I perceive 
changes in the way military courts functioned through time, and the attitude of Palestinian 
lawyers towards dealing with them at the first place.78 At the same time, the Palestinian 
                                               
71 Concerning the jurisdiction of the development of Israeli Supreme Court case law in civil cases, see generally 
(Karayanni 2009). While in many cases, the Israeli Supreme Court declined to subject Israeli government 
policies – such as the “targeted preemptive killings” – deeming it to be non-justiciable. (Ben-Naftali and 
Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted 
Killings 2003, 235) 
72 See generally (Paust, Glahn and Woratsch 1990)  
73 “Judges in [Israeli Military] courts are Israel army officers (one with legal training, two without). The principal 
function of these courts is to try security offences, but they have jurisdiction over all criminal cases and do take 
some non-security cases, too.” (Quigley, Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of Law 1981, 120). 
74 (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 9). 
75 (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 69-70). 
76 Order 947, cited in: (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 88). 
77 See generally (Karayanni 2009). 
78 For more about Israeli Military Court, see generally (Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court 
System in the West Bank and Gaza 2005).  
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Authority may fail this test of Rule of Law as Standard, for the way justice is administered 
and the reticence of adopting a Judicial Law and the Basic Law itself (until 2002). Similar 
critics were raised by Human Rights Organizations concerning the establishment of State 
Security Courts, by Presidential Decree (later on abolished).79  
V. Rejecting Formal Conceptions of the Rule of Law 
The formal conceptions of the Rule of law do not provide an adequate tool for deciding on 
the nature of military orders, and the attitude towards them. Besides, such analysis is 
unsatisfactory because the above insights did not deal with the substance but only with the 
form of rules. A positivist approach to the rule of law is incapable of explaining the original 
sin of the new legal system, and the possibility of building legality over an illegal act of 
occupation.80 The Rule of Law as Legality cannot escape recognizing a colonial law, or an 
apartheid law, whenever the standards of the inner morality of law are respected. Finally, 
even the Rule of Law as Procedure is incapable of dealing with ‘justice’ administered under 
occupation, the opposite of justice.81 Indeed, there seems to be no reference to a particular 
content of those rules, to the legitimacy of the law giver, and to the goals that are realized by 
them.  
For a Palestinian jurist (whether judge or lawyer),82 it seems absolutely absurd to be neutral 
towards those enactments, simply because, as he may rightly observe, such military 
enactments are often used to realize colonial objectives, rather than Palestinian people’s 
                                               
79 For a discussion of the State Security Courts, and critiques of Human Rights Organizations, see (Hajjar, Law 
against Order: Human Rights Organizations and (versus?) the Palestinian Authority 2001, 72-5).  
80 About the illegality of occupation, see generally (Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, Illegal Occupation: Framing 
the Occupied Palestinian Terrority 2005);  
81 Even the role of Israeli High Court of Justice may lead to undermining the fact of occupation. As pointed 
out by Martti Koskenniemi: “The acceptability of the use of discretion by a law-applying institution such as the 
Israeli High Court of Justice is based on the assumption that its preferences and moral sensibilities are broadly 
reflective of the preferences and sensibilities of the community in which it exercises its jurisdiction. When 
jurisdiction is exercised in conditions of occupation, however, such consensus cannot be easily presumed. On 
the contrary, recourse to moral pathos by an institution of the occupying power will appear to normalize its 
jurisdiction and add an element of hypocrisy to the felt illegitimacy of its possessing jurisdiction in the first 
place. Moreover, it will undermine the moral and political significance of the fact of the occupation, even 
diminishing the urgency of bringing it to an end.” (Koskenniemi 2008, 13) (emphasis omitted).  
82 Although I dealt in this paper with those questions from the perspective of a Palestinian judge, similar 
questions can be raised with regards to legal responsibility and moral obligation of Israeli soldiers and officials 
to obey Israeli military orders. See generally (Osiel 1998). 
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interest: land is expropriated from Palestinians,83 where Israeli settlements are built instead,84 
water rights largely curtailed,85 houses are demolished,86 Palestinians are detained 
administratively,87 targeted and killed without process.88 It is also by military orders that 
freedoms (of movement, of religion, of the press, of opinion, and so on) are restricted.89 It is 
through military orders that persons are denied re-entry to the West Bank and Gaza Strip,90 
access to East Jerusalem,91 families are separated,92 Palestinians denationalized,93 workers 
denied access to their place of work, farmers to their land, and students to their schools.94  
In other words, the three formal conceptions of the Rule of Law do not seem to deal with 
the core issue. Such conceptions of the Rule of Law, on the contrary, simply facilitated 
Israeli control of the Palestinian population and Palestinian land.95 It provided the 
                                               
83 “However, it remains the preference of all Israeli authorities that land acquisition be carried out by “legal” 
means. The determination of the legality or illegality of an action can be arrived at only in relation to a legal 
framework.” (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 42). “Despite the dubious 
international legality of the changes made to the laws in force in the West Bank, it is these laws which Israel 
utilizes to transfer ownership of land from Palestinian to Jewish hands. When the legality of Israeli practices in 
this sphere is challenged, the legality or illegality is determined according to the legal order imposed by Israel 
since it has been occupying the West Bank.” (Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 43)  
84 See generally (Quigley, Living in Legal Limbo: Israel's Settlers in Occupied Palestinian Territory 1998); (Jiryis 
1985); (Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Terrority 2005, 
579-88).  
85 See generally (Dillman 1989); (Scobbie 1994-1995);   
86 For a discussion of Israeli practice of house demolitions, (Farrell 2002-2003); (Halabi 1991);  
87 See generally (Rishmawi 1989).  
88 See generally (Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the 
Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings 2003) 
89 Through military orders, “Israeli military government […] imposed on [the Palestinians] long-term curfews 
that restrict their movement, and censored their newspapers.” (Quigley, Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of 
Law 1981, 119).  
90 See generally (Khalil, Irregular Migration into and through the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2009).  
91 For more about the status of East Jerusalem under international law, (Tulman 1997); (Cassese 1986); (Hirsch 
2005).   
92 See generally (Quigley, Family Reunion and the Right to Return to Occupied Territory 1992); (Khalil, Family 
Unification in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2009).  
93 See generally (Kattan 2005).  
94 Most recently the building of the separation wall has aggravated the situation in the day-to-day life of 
Palestinian population of the West Bank. For opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the 
“Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, issued on July 9, 
2004, see summary of the opinion available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf  
95 Bisharat argued convincingly that this is the case with acquisition of land. He argued that “the occupation 
administration’s strategy in acquiring Arab land in the Occupied Territories has been, in its reliance on law, 
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occupation power with a very sophisticated tool, law and legality, to realize what may be 
considered as basic rights of the Palestinians, as a people or as individuals. Besides, the 
Palestinian Authority legislated statutes may easily fail such a test set out by a formal 
conception of the Rule of Law, at least as a theoretical possibility. For Palestinian jurists the 
formal conceptions of the Rule of Law are simply not enough to differentiate substantially 
between legislated statutes and military orders.96 
The formal conceptions of the Rule of Law seem to tell only half of the story. They do not 
tell us much about the rationales that justified at first place, the imposition of limitation or at 
least the imposition of certain restrictions on the law giver in the exercise of his main power 
to legislate, to create positive law. Departing from this insight, one may wonder, how can it be 
possible to read Fuller’s insistence on the principle of the legality and use it as if it was 
simply an argument of technicalities of the way rules ought to be in order to be capable of 
being followed? Isn’t it necessary to read that theory on the light of Fuller’s understanding of 
what the law is and why it is so? “Every departure from the principles of the law's inner 
morality”, to put it in Fuller’s same words, “is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible 
agent.” In other words, it seems that Fuller, for didactical purposes distinguished inner 
morality of law from external morality of law.97 For that reason, is it possible, without 
undermining the whole enterprise of having moral law, to separate between internal and 
external morality of law?  
Similar arguments can be said towards positivist conception of law as law. Isn’t in the name 
legal certainty and predictability – thus avoiding to fall in the trap of rulers’ whims – that  
positivists insist on their “Rule of Law tout court”, rejecting any interference from outside 
the domain of the law? Isn’t it the insistence on protection of individuals from arbitrary use 
of power that insistence on fair procedures in the administration of justice could be justified 
                                                                                                                                            
consistent with the approach taken to land acquisition in Israel proper.” (Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy 
in Israel and the Occupied Territories 1994, 526). In his many books and articles, Shehadeh provides different 
examples of how Israel used law to annex Palestinian land and expel Palestinian populations. See for example 
(Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank 1988, 4-5).  
96 Some even called the system with the opposite of Rule of Law (Mis-Rule of Law), see (B. Cohen 2001) 
referring to Israeli legal system’s failure to prevent such atrocity to be exercised in the occupied territories; and 
(Emon 2003) referring to destructions effectuated by Israel of civil institutions, its settlement’s policy, and its 
destruction of Palestinian economy.  
97 See (Fuller, The Morality of Law, Revised Edition 1969, 153).  
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at first place?98 Those and many other values, implicit to the Rule of Law, make it a fragile 
and contested ideal, but still attractive and crucial ones, “one of the most important political 
ideals of our time.”99  
VI. Law, Freedom and Rights 
In the beginning, I admitted that there is a connection between the values embedded in the 
rule of law and the concept of law, now it is time to look at those values. Both military 
orders and legislated statutes are indeed human made laws, thus, positive in nature. 
“Positivity is partly a matter of what law is: it is human, it is contingent, [and] it is the 
product of historical process.”100 As such, law is a mode of governance, it is accordingly 
susceptible to change and modification. Most importantly, the idea of law conveys an 
elementary sense of freedom, because the norms we are governed by could be simply 
different.101  
But how can freedom co-exist with law, which is, by definition, restriction on freedom? 
Montesquieu may answer with one simple word: liberty. That is the “power of doing what 
we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will.”102 Such a 
liberty is fragile, and cannot exist when there is an abuse of power. Montesquieu concluded 
that liberty exists (i.e. freedom from abuse of power) only when powers are separated, and 
when power checks other power.103 This makes his ideal type of the “Constitution of 
Liberty” possible.104  
As a mode of governance, law, especially positive law, is strictly connected to the 
government, which is “an art whereby a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon 
the foundation of common right or interest” or “the empire of laws and not of men”.105 For 
Harrington, a government for a nation is similar to the soul for a man. The virtue of 
                                               
98 For a discussion about those needs implicit in the discourses of rule of law, see (Waldron, The Concept and 
the Rule of Law 2008, 6-7). 
99 (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 3). 
100 (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 30). 
101 (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 2008, 31). 
102 In chapter of his “The Spirit of the Laws” (1748), see (Montesquieu 1777, 196).  
103 (Montesquieu 1777, 197).  
104 (Vile 1967, 93).  
105 (Harrington 1656). 
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government is law (equivalent to reason for a human being, not passion). Since human soul 
can give up its will either to reason or to passion – the one leading to felicity and the other to 
misery – liberty for a man consists in the empire of his reason. Similarly, it is liberty that 
makes a commonwealth a government of law, not of men. Since it uses rules (the 
government gives up its will to reason) not rulers’ whims (thus giving up its will to passion). 
The Americans, much earlier than Montesquieu, had reached the same conclusion. To use 
Madison’s words: “ambition” that “counteracts ambition”.106 To explain the genius solution 
of check and balance, Harrington uses the metaphor of two silly girls willing to divide and 
share a cake, “you divide” said one of the two girls, and “I will choose”.107  
The idea of freedom, thus of liberty, inherent to the idea of law, limits the government, in 
that it imposes restrictions on the way sovereign power is exercised. This limitation has sense 
only if explained by the existence of rights for individuals that are beyond the sovereign 
power of the government, before it, and independently from it. It is the idea of right, to use 
Tocqueville’s words, that “enabled men to define anarchy and tyranny, and that taught them 
how to be independent without arrogance and to obey without servility.”108 One of those 
rights, a basic one, is property. Tocqueville himself, describing what he had witnessed in 
America, concluded: “As everyone has property of his own to defend, everyone recognizes 
the principle upon which he holds it.”109  
Interestingly enough, F.A. Hayek picks up this same idea of liberty, central to Montesquieu, 
and makes it the core of his theoretical construction of the Rule of Law.110 However he uses 
this idea exactly to justify the need of abstention of the state from certain domains or areas, 
which are private, and need to remain so. Hayek’s conception of liberty seems to be 
negative, since it can be interpreted as being the absence of coercion. It is nonetheless 
connected to individuals’ autonomy and independence; i.e. individuals perceived as free 
agents. Hayek indeed perceives “the recognition of private […] property is thus an essential 
                                               
106 From Federalist n.51 (James Madison), see (Hamilton, Ray and Madison 2001, 268). 
107 (Harrington 1656). 
108 See chapter 14 of (Tocqueville 1831), available online at: 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/1_ch14.htm.  
109 See chapter 14 of (Tocqueville 1831), available online at: 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/1_ch14.htm. 
110 See (Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 1960).  
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condition for the prevention of coercion,”111 although not the only one. For Hayek indeed, 
the rule of law “stripped of all technicalities […] means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and 
to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”112  
Hayek’s conception of the Rule of Law (that I will call, for an issue of convenience, “Rule of 
Law as Freedom”) perceives law in a similar way to the laws of nature that enable individuals 
to plan their lives accordingly. Predictability of the law, its character as being general, 
impersonal and stable, etc. become necessary characteristic of the law. This position, if taken 
to the extreme, means that many (or maybe all) contemporary legal systems may fail the tests 
of Rule of Law as Freedom. Most importantly Hayek seems to be reticent of using legislated 
laws, in a way that coerce agents’ freedoms. It is in that sense that legislation, even by a 
democratically elected body, may constitute an obstacle to Hayek’s conception of the rule of 
law. Hayek seems in a sense to be more inclined to encourage the development of law, not 
planning its creation. He seems to go exactly to reach the completely opposite conclusion of 
Bentham, who in the name of predictability, considered common law as obscure and 
customary law as “fiction from beginning to end”,113 which explains his attack on judge-
made law, or case-by-case law.114  
Dworkin’s insight at this point becomes crucial. His conception of the Rule of Law is 
substantive because it seems to favor a commitment to a theory of rights.115 Whenever a 
judge needs to decide hard cases, judges do not exercise discretion; rather he/she approaches 
law integrity116 (that I will call, for an issue of convenience, Rule of Law as Integrity). In 
other words, Dworkin seems to be adding a new characterization for that agent that needs to 
apply the law - whether this agent refers to the individual that needs to abide by the law, and 
                                               
111 (Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 1960). 
112 (Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 1944, 54), cited in: (Raz 1979, 288). Raz pursued his analysis to show why he 
thinks that the conclusion that Hayek draws from that, according to Raz, show one of the fallacies of the 
contemporary treatment of the rule of law: “the assumption of its overriding importance.”  
113 (Bentham 1970 (1782), 103).  
114 See (Waldron, Retroactive Law: How Dodgy was Duynhoven? 2004, 639).  
115 See (Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 1977). 
116 See (Dworkin, Law's Empire 1986).  
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of the judge that needs to apply the law. Such free agent as Hayek would insist is also a 
moral agent. It is maybe this idea of integrity in both legislation (accordingly lawmakers try 
to make laws morally coherent) and common law (judges try to make laws adjudicatively 
coherent) that may favor at the same time codification and systematicity in law.117 
VII. Conclusion: Legislated Statutes and the Rule of Law 
The suggestion I made in this paper is that only a substantial conception of the Rule of Law 
can provide a valid tool for differentiating between both enactments. While rule by military 
orders by definition fails the tests of Rule of Law as Freedom and as Integrity,118 the 
Palestinian Authority commitment to law creation through legislated statutes constitute a 
premise, a necessary one, for the Rule of Law as Freedom and as Integrity.  
The law-making through legislated statutes however, is a sine qua non of the rule of law. 
However, legislated statues alone are not enough. On the contrary, the fact that the PLO 
accepted to maintain military orders unless duly amended,119 and most importantly, coexisted 
with Israeli Military Commander in the task of law making,120 put the Palestinian Authority 
under a serious risk of committing two extreme, but related, errors: to assimilate with 
military decrees or to completely disassociate from them. In both cases, the danger is the 
same; that is to convert legislated statutes exclusively as a tool of social control that serve 
exclusively to coercing subjects, rather than providing an atmosphere necessary for free 
agents to exercise their liberties, free of coercion.  
The Palestinian Authority, as a law-giver, risks at the same time, two different but 
intrinsically related tendencies. On the one side, there is a clear tendency to legislate law, as 
fast as possible, and in as many areas as possible. Hundreds of laws, decree laws, and bylaws 
were adopted since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, even before the election 
of the Palestinian Legislative Council. The risk here is a tendency of the legislature to expand 
its power, to think that by legislation it is possible to create any law, covering any domain of 
                                               
117 See (Dworkin, Law's Empire 1986, 176-86), cited and discussed in: (Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of 
Law 2008, 44-5).  
118 As pointed out by Lisa Hajjar, “the law was utilized [in the decades of Israeli occupation] to dispossess and 
disempower rather than protect Palestinians. This fostered skepticism about law’s positive possibilities.” 
(Hajjar, Law against Order: Human Rights Organizations and (versus?) the Palestinian Authority 2001, 75). For 
a discussion about human rights under the Palestinian Authority, see generally (Weiner 1995, 819-35).  
119 See article XVIII of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 1995. 
120 See generally (Weiner 1995, 814-8); 
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individuals’ life, without any restrictions whatsoever. Most importantly, the elected legislative 
body, may be willing to expand its powers on the expense of the executive or even the 
judiciary, and outside a principle which is theoretically included as a basis of the Palestinian 
Authority legal and political system; i.e. the separation of power. The non-sovereign 
character of the PA “exacerbates the perceived need and tendency to silence critics and 
repress political opponents,”121 while at the same time renders accountability under 
international human rights treaties de iure impossible.122  
On the other side, the Palestinian Authority seems not to exclude the rule by decree neither; 
accordingly, granting or maintaining a primordial role of the executive, especially the 
President of the Palestinian Authority. Such a role is entrenched even in a written 
constitution-like legislated text, the Basic Law of 2003. Following the Hamas coup in Gaza in 
2007, the declaration of the state of emergency by President Abbas, a technocratic 
government under Salam Fayyad was formed, and a new era of “rule by decree” was set in 
motion in the West Bank, surprisingly with the support of the international community, 
which saw in this situation an opportunity to realize reforms in many domains, including the 
security governance and public finance.  
Those two risky tendencies may appear at first instance as being contradictory, but they are 
on the contrary, completely coherent. They are the result of the legacies that the Palestinian 
Authority had inherited; the first one of decades of Israeli occupation that did not come to 
an end with Oslo, and on the other the legacy of the PLO, a liberation movement. Military 
orders in fact are adopted by Israeli military “governors (whether personally or by those 
authorized by them), in their capacity of a law giver, executer and judge, at the same time. 
Accordingly, all authorities are concentrated in the same person. The PLO itself, although 
adopted theoretically three branches of government (the Palestinian National Council acting 
as a Parliament like body, the Executive Committee, chosen from within the Palestinian 
National Council, serves as a cabinet, and Military Courts), had such a concentration of 
powers in the chairman of the Executive Committee. 
                                               
121 (Hajjar, Law against Order: Human Rights Organizations and (versus?) the Palestinian Authority 2001, 76). 
For a discussion of the impact of the character of the Palestinian Authority on protection of human rights, see 
(Aruri and Caroll 1994, 9-12).  
122 See generally (Weiner 1995, 795-803);  
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At the same time (and here is the most relevant distinction in my view, between military 
decree and legislated status), military orders is about creating law as rules, that leave as less as 
possible margin of freedom and choice for individuals, that regulate various aspects of social, 
economic, and political life, in a way that prioritize public order, safety and raison d’état. On 
the contrary, legislated statutes are interested in putting forward a framework of action, for 
state agents, and for individuals, to act accordingly, as free and moral agents.  
It is my impression, although not in a measure right now to develop it or prove it, that the 
decades of rule by military orders may have contributed to the creation of this need for 
social control through regulation of social, economic and political life or at least the 
perception of it. This leads me to suspect that the decades of occupation somehow 
contributed to developing authoritarian system in the Palestinian Authority.123 Not only from 
the perspective of the authority itself, which undertake a systematic regulation of each aspect 
of individuals and groups life, but also from the perspective of individuals themselves, 
whether state agents, who need to apply the law, or individuals, who not only feel, but also 
demand, and insist in having clear and pre-established legislated rules. The result is acceptance 
and advocacy of formalism and statutory positivism, both dangerous risks for a healthy 
development and change of law to accommodate changing social needs.  
Back to our Palestinian judge of the Court of Ramallah, who does not necessarily doubt 
whether or not the rules included in the statutes legislated by the Palestinian Authority 
constitute rules of law, but needs to know whether he is under the moral obligation to obey 
them. One way of answering this is simply by saying: “sure!” Law, whenever enacted by a 
legitimate authority, merits our obedience. This attitude is somehow justified,124 but it is 
nonetheless still within the same system that we have outlined as dangerous, i.e. 
authoritarianism.125 On the contrary, a second answer would be that, even in the case of a 
                                               
123 In a recent article with a significant title “Law against Order,” Lisa Hajjar reached a similar conclusion, 
calling the PA rule as “autonomous authoritarianism” (Hajjar, Law against Order: Human Rights Organizations 
and (versus?) the Palestinian Authority 2001). For the impact of the inverted process that took place in the 
occupied Palestinian territories after Oslo and the impact on women rights, see (Ludsin 2005).  
124 This is the position of Hannah Arendt who believed that authoritarianism meant obedience to legitimate 
authority and hierarchy as a matter of acceptance of traditionally constituted, past authority. Cited and 
discussed in: (Henderson 1991, 390). 
125 The risk is to pass from substantial authoritarianism to formal authoritarianism, in the way distinguished by 
Lynn Henderson: “Authoritarianism has at least two different meanings: one simply of unquestioning 
obedience to authority, and one of obedience combined with the use of authority to repress, punish and 
oppress human beings. Obedience to authority itself might best be described as formal authoritarianism – it is 
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legitimate authority, the judge, as much as the individuals need to approach law in their 
capacity of moral agents. Their choice is not the result of arbitrary exercise of discretion that 
undermines the Rule of Law because it subjected individuals’ actions to whims of men. 
Rather their choice is justified by perceiving law as integrity.   
Israel had used law and legality to rule the territories under its control. Using legality 
contributed largely to maintaining the occupation, illegal itself. Such a system of (Mis)Rule of 
Law coexisted with oppression, restriction of freedoms, and dispossession of rights. It led to 
the normalization of the ‘exception’ in the day-to-day politics.126 The establishment of a 
national authority, while occupation persisted, led to similar attitudes towards law as means of 
social control. Largely as a result of Oslo agreements and the nature of the Palestinian 
Authority itself, public order and security prevailed over freedoms and rights. In times of 
occupation, laws have spoken; and they have spoken disturbingly loud. They were 
oppressive and pervasive of all aspects of individuals’ lives. For those who live under the 
heavy burden of those laws, the language is still the same, as much as their mistrust. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
solely concerned with the process of identifying authoritative commands or directions and then following 
them. Substantive authoritarianism, on the other hand, not only entails the process of obeying commands or 
rules, but also involves oppression and punishment.” (Henderson 1991, 390).   
126 For a discussion of the character of international law of occupation as temporary and exceptional, similar to 
emergency times, see generally (Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied 
Palestinian Terrority 2005, 605-8).  
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